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Abstract
Citizen feedback  is considered an effective means  for  expectations  about service  performance,  influence  a
improving the performance  of public utilities.  But how  household's satisfaction with service delivery.  The
well does such information reflect  the actual quality of  authors  find that satisfaction increases with
service  delivery? Do so-called scorecards  or report cards  improvements  in the household's  own service  status, a
measure  public service delivery accurately,  or do  finding that supports the use of scorecard  initiatives.  But
personal  and community characteristics  have a significant  the results also suggest that a household's satisfaction is
impact on residents'  assessment of service quality?  influenced  by how service quality compares with that of
Deichmann  and Lall investigate  these questions using  its neighbors  or peers and by household level
newly available household  survey data on access to and  characteristics  such as welfare and tenure status. This
satisfaction  with selected  public services  in two Indian  implies that responses in satisfaction  surveys are at least
cities-Bangalore  and Jaipur. They develop a framework  in part determined  by factors that are unrelated to  the
where  actual levels of services received,  as well as  service  performance  experienced  by the household.
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Citizen feedback and delivery of urban services
1.  Introduction
Citizen feedback is often seen as an effective  means for evaluating the quality of urban
public service delivery. The rationale  behind this approach is that collective  or organized
feedback can be used to demand accountability  from providers of public services,
especially when there are no alternate providers due to regulation and natural monopolies
in the delivery of these services.  One of the most widely cited examples of organized
citizen feedback  is the 'report card' or 'scorecard'  where users are asked to rate their
satisfaction with various aspects of service provision (Paul  1998). Examples include
evaluation of service delivery in India, the Philippines, Ukraine,  Malaysia, and the United
States (Shah and Wagle  2001, World Bank 2001, UMP  2000). Report cards that solicit
feedback can provide citizens an opportunity to shape the decisions that affect their lives.
Stern (2002), among others, therefore suggests that such initiatives are a promising
instrument for empowerment
Since the objective of scorecards is to create public awareness as well as enhance
responsiveness of service providers, it is useful to examine the extent to which such
information reflects the actual quality of service delivery. Do these scorecards or report
cards reflect accurately what citizens get in return for taxes or user charges, or are
responses significantly influenced by personal and community characteristics? If
responses are influenced by subjective factors, then it becomes difficult to compare
service levels across user groups on the basis of feedback alone. For example, two
individuals receiving the same service level may respond quite differently to questions
about their satisfaction with service delivery, depending on their incomes or educational
attainment.  Similarly, relative  disparities in service levels between individuals and their
peer groups may influence satisfaction scores. At any given level of service, we may be
less satisfied if we see that our neighbors receive better services.  Such behavioral and
psychological factors could distort evaluation of the actual service levels received and
could therefore diminish the utility of citizen report cards in public policy making. Itappears, however, that despite the increasing popularity of these approaches in the
development community,  we know little about the relative magnitude of objective versus
subjective factors. Adding to the difficulties  in evaluating the utility of scorecards  is the
frequent absence of clear benchmarks for public service provision.  If there are no
standards to which public service providers have committed, then evaluating whether or
not the provider is doing a satisfactory job becomes a subjective process that is
influenced by the idiosyncratic judgment of each service user.
In this paper we investigate citizen satisfaction with various attributes of service delivery
using newly available  household survey data from two Indian cities. These  surveys
collected detailed information on households'  satisfaction with various aspects of service
delivery as well as information on actual service  attributes. Our main objective is to
examine the extent to which household and community characteristics influence  a
household's satisfaction with service delivery.  Our basic premise is that satisfaction  is
determined by both the actual service levels and by expectations  about service quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  We present  an overview of the
existing literature on measuring satisfaction with service delivery in Section 2. In Section
3, we discuss some of the literature examining determinants  of satisfaction.  A model of
satisfaction from service provision is presented in Section 4. We discuss the data in
Section 5 and results in Section 6. Conclusions and policy implications are presented in
Section 7.
2.  Scorecards  and  benchmarking in public service  provision
Despite recent and sometimes controversial privatization initiatives, public ownership of
utilities remains the most widely adopted model for the provision of basic services in
developing countries (Roth  1987, Noll et al. 2000, Estache et al. 2001). For a number of
reasons, services delivered by these institutions often remain inadequate.  In many rural
and urban areas, large proportions of the population have little or no access to public
services. The quality of services for those who receive them is often poor -characterized
by low quantities provided, inconveniences  imposed on the users, frequent breakdowns
and unresponsive providers. At the same time, few utilities are able to recover sufficient
funds to cover the full cost of service provision, let alone to invest in improvement or
2extension of services within their jurisdictions.  Pricing is often politically motivated with
little concern for cost of provision and distribution of benefits. Subsidies-intentionally
or not-frequently tend to benefit better-off residents (Hentschel and Lanjouw 2000,
Walker et al. 2000).
What options do residents have to address these shortcomings in public sector
performance?  Hirschman's  (1970) voice and exit are the main responses available to
consumers confronted with inadequate goods and services. Exit is a viable strategy in
competitive markets where alternative providers  exist and the risk of market failure is
limited. These conditions are rarely met in the basic services sectors, although private
providers often play a limited role in compensating  for inadequate public provision. For
instance, private water vendors  supply under-serviced areas in many developing country
cities (e.g., Lovei and Whittington  1993) and own-provision of solid waste disposal
services has been initiated in some urban areas (Dahiya 2003).  However, many public
services such as piped water supply, sewerage  or electricity, require large capital
investments to operate efficiently, have significant economies of scale and considerable
network effects. Small-scale private or own provision therefore  tends to be more
expensive than the alternative of a well-regulated monopolistic  supplier. Exit  therefore  is
usually not a viable option for those who obtain public services and is, of course,  an
irrelevant issue for those who do not.
Voice, in contrast, is an option both for households receiving inadequate service and for
those without access. Generally, voice refers to the pressure that can be exerted on public
service providers by well-organized citizen groups. This may occur either directly
through complaint or protest, or indirectly by influencing or participating in the political
process in cases where utilities are controlled by democratically  elected public officials.
During the last decade, citizen groups in a number of countries have championed the use
of public feedback mechanisms to improve the performance  of public sector entities. The
rationale behind these efforts is that due to the monopolistic nature of public service
provision and prevailing public apathy, public utilities typically lack the incentives to
provide the highest possible service standards. Public disclosure of these shortcomings
3will exert pressure on public service providers that can lead to improvements in their
performance  and increase the quality of life of their customers.
A well documented example is the work by the Public Affairs Center (PAC) in Bangalore
India (Paul  1998, 2002). The Bangalore report cards summarize citizens'  assessment of
services provided by public agencies or utilities such as the local development authority,
water and sanitation board, transport authority and hospitals. In addition to overall
satisfaction scores, the PAC scorecards solicit opinions about specific aspects of service
provision. These include staff behavior, quality of service and communication of
information. PAC also collects information on bribes paid in connection with service
provision and household investments to cope with shortcomings  in service provision such
as water storage tanks or voltage stabilizers. Both add to the household's total cost of
obtaining public services. PAC's work in Bangalore is reported to have triggered tangible
efforts by the local government to improve service provision. It also led to similar work
in several Indian cities (Balakrishnan and Sekhar 1998) as well as a country-wide
initiative, the Millennial Survey of Public Services in India (PAC 2002).
Scorecard initiatives have not been limited to developing countries.  In industrial countries
the desire to improve performance of local government functions has led to the
establishment of so-called benchmarking  initiatives (e.g.,  Samuels  1998). These assess
performance  internally but also attempt to measure the satisfaction of the users of public
services. Other examples of citizen initiatives in both developing and western countries
have been reviewed by the Institute of Development Studies (Goetz and Gaventa 2001).
The accumulated evidence suggests that report cards, initiatives to amplify or coordinate
citizen's voice, and benchmarking  approaches can be an effective  advocacy tool. There is
limited experience,  however, to conclude that citizen feedback initiatives are objective
instruments for measuring local government performance.
3.  Determinants of  satisfaction
Most scorecard initiatives seek to base their advocacy on empirical evidence  mostly in
the form of survey information that measures the satisfaction of citizens with various
aspects of public service provision. Residents state whether or not they are satisfied or
4they are asked to rank their satisfaction  level on a predetermined  scale. Subjective self-
evaluation of perceived rankings, however, may not provide a completely accurate
reflection of the reality faced by residents. The main constraints relate to measurement
and context. The first issue is that reported satisfaction may not equal actual satisfaction
which is unknown to anyone except the respondent.  It would be virtually impossible to
design a measurement approach that allows households to rank satisfaction
unambiguously using'the same cardinal or ordinal  scale. Any interpretation of such data,
however, assumes that interpersonal  comparisons of the benefits or utility derived from a
given level of service are consistent. The problem is similar to the one faced when
analyzing utility more generally. As reviewed by Ng (1997), many economists reject
attempts to measure and compare utility. For this reason, studies that analyze subjective
variables such as satisfaction or happiness scores have traditionally been met with
skepticism among economists. This has changed recently, in part due to the evidence
accumulated by psychologists on the validity of subjective responses on topics related to
utility, welfare or satisfaction (Diener et al. 1999). The second main caveat concerning
the interpretation of scorecard responses  is that reported satisfaction may be influenced
by a multitude of contextual  factors only some of which will be related to the
characteristics of the service itself. Other factors 'such as personal and community
characteristics  will also influence perceptions about the quality of the service received.
There has been little empirical analysis of the determinants  of satisfaction with public
services.  But there exist two strands of literature that are of relevance to our questions:
studies on the determinants of happiness in general  and satisfaction with economic status
in particular, and the marketing  literature on customer satisfaction.  Concerning the
former, Blanchflower and Oswald (2003) provide  a concise list of the main determinants
of self-reported  well-being:  circumstances,  aspirations, comparison with others, and what
they refer to as a person's "baseline happiness".  In the context of public service delivery,
the first two of these factors correspond to performance and expectations. Performance  is
the actual,' quantifiable level of service received by the household. If scorecard initiatives
are to be credible, performance should be the main determinant of perceived  service
delivery and thus satisfaction.  Perceptions, however,  are influenced by expectations-the
benchmark against which a person measures actual experiences.  Furthermore,
5expectations may be formed by personal  characteristics such as education, but they may
also be influenced by the household's comparison of own service access with that of
others. "Baseline satisfaction" is best considered as an idiosyncratic  component that
describes the willingness to put up with adverse conditions, or conversely,  the tendency
to complain.  We could term this the squeaky wheel factor.  Given the close relationship
between determinants of happiness and satisfaction, research on happiness and welfare
clearly has much to teach us in understanding satisfaction with basic service provision.
The study of perceived welfare or happiness originated in psychology but has
subsequently also attracted the interest of economists  (see Veenhoven  1996, Dixon  1997,
Diener et al.  1999, Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Lokshin and Ravallion 2001,
Blanchflower and Oswald 2003). One of the first and most significant findings was
Easterlin's (1974) proposition that increases in income do not considerably increase a
person's happiness. Oswald (1997), for example,  confirms these findings in a study of
happiness over time in the US and Britain. While average income has increased
considerably over the last several decades,  the proportion of survey respondents who
stated that they are happy has increased much less. Thus, the general conclusion is that
"money does not buy happiness, or at least not much" (Ng  1997). Instead,  happiness in
those countries was found to be correlated with being married, employed and seems to be
U-shaped in age with a minimum in the early thirties.
A common theme in this literature is the importance of reference group comparison.
Easterlin (1974) proposes that relative income is more important than absolute income  in
determining happiness. In the context of job and income satisfaction, Clark and Oswald
(1996) analyze satisfaction with income among British workers. They find an inverse
relationship  between workers'  income satisfaction and their reference or comparison
income, which is derived as the predicted income for the worker based on a standard
earnings equation using the entire cross-sectional  data set. Workers'  satisfaction,
according to this analysis, is less influenced by absolute income levels, than by how that
income compares to that of similar persons with similar jobs. This confirmed earlier work
on reference group effects that indicates that unemployed workers in Britain who live in
areas of high unemployment show less mental distress-i.e., are less unhappy-than
6those in areas of low unemployment (Clark and Oswald  1994). Frank (1997) discusses
the issue of reference groups more generally and concludes that satisfaction  is greatly
influenced by the individual's or household's relative position. One manifestation of this
is the desire of people to "keep up with the Jones  n.
Another strand of the satisfaction literature has its origin in the field of consumer research
and marketing.  Customer satisfaction is a pre-requisite for customer loyalty.
Consequently, there has been a lot of interest in determining what drives consumer
satisfaction.  This research draws extensively on the psychology literature. Marketing
research has identified two main models of satisfaction that differ significantly in how
performance and expectations  are linked (Johnson et al.  1995 and 1996; see also Sasser et
al. 1978, Boulding et al.  1993, Driver 2002). The disconfirmation  model assumes that
satisfaction is the difference between performance and expectations. If performance is
equal to or higher than expectations,  the customer is satisfied. If expectations exceed
performance, the customer is dissatisfied.  This implies that the absolute level of product
or service performance does not need to influence satisfaction directly. For instance,  a
poor household  with low expectations may find that relatively low service quality still
exceeds these expectations.  The household may thus be as satisfied as a rich household
with high expectations and much better service availability.  Expectations thus serve as a
standard of reference that reflects opinions about what the service provider should
deliver. Obviously, these could be far from realistic.
An alternative approach that has gained increasing following in marketing is the
performance model in which both product or service quality and expectations affect
satisfaction levels positively. The performance model assumes that expectations serve  as
an "anchor" to the evaluation of performance.  Performance,  as perceived by the customer
then determines satisfaction  levels. Customers are assumed to continuously adjust their
expectations as they experience the products or services. They will thus have a (more or
less) realistic idea of what the service provider will deliver.  Expectations and
performance will therefore never vary by much and both could therefore be positively
related to satisfaction levels. Johnson et al.  (1996) point out that this model is similar to
7the cognitive process of anchoring and adjustment described by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974).'
4.  A model of  satisfaction  from service  provision
The evidence reviewed in the previous section informs our model of satisfaction with
basic urban services,  in this case water supply.  In this model, utility-i.e., satisfaction
with service delivery-is a function of actual service performance and the person's
expectations about service performance.  Thus in our framework,  U =f(A, E), where U
represents utility or the perceived  satisfaction derived  from provision of a service. A
represents a vector of characteristics describing the quality and quantity of the service
received by the individual,  and E is a vector of individual and community characteristics
that determine  a person's expectations about service performance.
Service performance is the actual level of service provided and available to the
household. It consists of measurable aspects such as the quantity provided, the frequency
at which the service is available and the quality of the product delivered. Most of these
can be measured with some degree of accuracy to yield indicators such as the quantity of
water provided to households, the number of days on which water is available or the
purity of the water coming out of the tap. But public service delivery also has aspects that
are less easily quantified,  for example, the responsiveness  of the provider in addressing
service problems or the courtesy of its representatives in their interaction with the general
public.2
In evaluating satisfaction with public services, individuals compare actual levels of
service performance with their expectations about service performance.  There are two
ways through which these expectations might be formed. The household may compare
the actual level of service received  to what the public utility will likely provide  given past
experience. For instance,  poor performance  in the past will lead the household to expect
XSee also Kahneman et al.  1999.  Johnson et al. (1996) discuss two additional models.  The rational
expectations model, assumes-along the lines of  the original  rational expectations theory (Muth 1961)-
that perceived  performance  and expectations are essentially identical. For complex products or services in
which performance  influences  satisfaction directly, they argue that performance  and expectations have a
positive relationship without expectations affecting satisfaction  directly.
These issues are extensively studied in the marketing literature  on the provision of private goods (Driver
2002).
8poor performance in the future. Alternatively, the expectation may be formed by some
assessment of what the public utility should  provide according to some idealized, but
possibly unrealistic, benchmark.  This benchmark might be determined arbitrarily,  such as
around-the-clock water supply in a city where households typically receive water for a
few hours every other day. In the context of public service provision, we initially favor
the performance model of consumer satisfaction.  We believe that households who
experience  actual levels of service delivery every day are likely to anchor their
expectations to the actual performance  of the utility. They are thus not assumed to have
unrealistic expectations about what providers could potentially deliver.
Direct measurement of expectations is clearly as difficult as measuring satisfaction itself.
We assume that expectations are influenced by various individual and/or household
attributes. These may include age (Duffy 2000), education (Clark and Oswald  1996), and
ethnicity (Bartel et al.  1996), as well as welfare status, tenure arrangements  and gender.
Education, for instance,  may increase aspirations and consequently expectations
concerning the level of services received in return for user fees or taxes. Furthermore,
more educated  citizens might be less reluctant to confront providers of public services
and more willing to complain about inadequate service provision. Higher education levels
might therefore be associated with lower satisfaction scores. Gender may influence
expectations in two  possibly contradictory, ways. If there are intra-household  differences
in the coping costs of inadeqte water supply-for example where households need to
rely on public taps-it is often women who bear the burden of obtaining water several
times a day. Their perception of services ieceived will be different and their
dissatisfaction will consequently be larger than that for household members who do not
share this burden. For the same reason, however, women may be better informed about
the actual level of service provision. If the performance model holds, they should be more
likely to anchor their expectations around actual service delivery. In that case, women
may not show lower satisfaction levels,  all else being equal. We also assume that home
owners have higher expectations concerning public service provision than short-term
renters, since the quality of services directly affects the value of the dwelling unit and
because owners are likely to remain in the same dwelling for a longer period of time.
9We define satisfaction or utility from water supply as a standard microeconomic model of
household behavior:
U= u(p(w),  i, j, x-c(w))  (la)
where p(w) represents the attributes of service performance  such as the quantity and
quality of water provision andj represents additional supply characteristics,  such as the
type and location of water supply. Further, i represents individual and household specific
characteristics  influencing expectations about water supply provision and x-c(w) is the
utility from consumption of other goods less the expenditure  on water. In this model,
satisfaction or perceived utility from water supply is increasing in service availability and
consumption of other goods, subject to expenditures on water. This is because utility will
decrease with higher cost of water procurement,  c(w).
Relative service performance  in reference group
While we believe that households have realistic expectations concerning service delivery,
evidence from the psychology and happiness literature suggests that additional factors
influence expectations and thus satisfaction levels. Moving beyond the traditional utility
maximizing framework in (l a), we assume that relative performance-the  quality of
service received in comparison with that received  by others-will modify expectations
and therefore perceived performance and thus satisfaction.  We modify (la) to consider
service performance  in the household's reference  group:
U = u(p(w), p(w*),  i,  j, x-c(w))  (Ib)
where p(w *) represents relative service performance in the reference group. Perceived
utility from water supply is an increasing function of a household's own service
performance and is also influenced by reference  group performance. For instance, utility
could be an increasing  function of the difference or ratio between service performance  for
the household and that of its reference  group. Thus, if a household receives poorer service
than its peer group, it is likely that its expectation is higher than actual performance  and
satisfaction is therefore low. Satisfaction is likely to be higher, if the household's peer
group receives equal or worse services,  even if the absolute level of service provision is
10inadequate.  In other words, shortcomings in service delivery may be more acceptable
when all neighbors or social acquaintances  are in the same situation, but unacceptable
when the household  is the only one suffering from low quality services. This suggests
that relative deprivation, in addition to the absolute service level, is critically important in
determining satisfaction.  Incorporating reference group service levels thus has the effect
of moving from the performance model (assuming "will expectations") towards the
disconfinnation model ("should expectations").
Figure 1 illustrates the assumptions underlying our model of reference group effects on
satisfaction.  Service levels in the household's reference  group are on the x-axis and own
service levels are on the y-axis. Utility, or in this case satisfaction from services increases
from the south east to the north west section of the graph.  This means that satisfaction
increases as own service levels improve in comparison to the reference group
(indifference curve ICO to IC2). Point A on ICO  shows satisfaction levels (or utility) when
the household receives the same service level as its reference group (z).  At A,
performance  equals expectations,  and the household will be satisfied by the service level
received.  Satisfaction decreases  as we move to indifference curve IC 1 when service
levels-in the reference group (z+q') are higher than that for the household (z-q, where q
does not need to equal q'). At point B, the "should  expectations"  are higher than
performance and the household perceives relative deprivation,  thereby reducing its
satisfaction from service provision. On the other hand, at point C on curve IC2, service
levels for the household  (z+q) are higher than the reference group (z-q'). In this case,
performance is better than expectations and the household perceives higher satisfaction
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Specification
As described in equation (lb) and Figure 1, satisfaction from services is a function of a
household's own service  levels and the relative service level in the reference group
controlling for other individual or group characteristics.  Our interest is in explicitly
measuring relative performance-i.e., reference  group performance relative to own
performance. Rather than using reference group performance  (P)  on its own, as for
example in the case of comparison income in Clark and Oswald (1996), we therefore use
the  'ratio  comparisons'  model specification suggested by Clark and Oswald (1998).
Satisfaction from services is thus defined as:
s; ='Pi  + T'(-5,)+ v7+Y1  + g  (2)
where Si  is the household's satisfaction or utility from attributes of service delivery, Pi
measures the household's own service performance and  P*  represents  service levels in
the household's reference group. The term (piI)  is the ratio of the service level between
the household  and its reference group.  The household receives  satisfaction from
12improvements  in its own service levels (a') as well as from surpassing its peers (')  when
P,>P  . Conversely, satisfaction is reduced if Pi<P  .3 The basic premise of this
specification is that utility (or in this case, satisfaction) depends upon a convex
combination of a direct private component of utility and a status or comparison oriented
element of utility (Clark and Oswald 1998). In addition to the service performance
variables, other factors influencing satisfaction include  Ii, which represents a set of
individual, household and service-specific  characteristics,  and  Yi are the benefits from
consumption of other products. Finally,  ei is a normally-distributed  error term with mean
zero and variance  a.
The definition of the household's reference  group is not straightforward because,  in most
cases, actual interaction cannot be easily observed.  In welfare studies it has been possible
to estimate a generic reference value of the variable of interest. For instance, Clark and
Oswald (1996) use an earnings regression to predict a reference  wage for workers.  The
deviation between the actual to the reference wage determines the worker's satisfaction
with current income (if the predicted wage is less than the actual wage) or dissatisfaction
(if current earnings are lower than those for the worker's hypothetical  peers).  This
abstract concept of a reference group can be contrasted with more direct definitions.  One
obvious possibility is to define this reference  group spatially. Households will tend to
interact mostly with other households nearby and will thus be aware of the levels of
service provision nearby.
An alternative assumption is that reference  groups are defined  socially rather than
geographically.  Much of the community participation literature,  for example, assumes
that people tend to interact most with others who are similar to themselves (e.g., Alesina
and La Ferrara 2000; see also Lall et al. 2002). Similarity may then be defined by a
common socioeconomic  standing, religion or ethnicity. For example, among well-off
residents, regardless of their place of residence, information might be exchanged at the
golf club rather than across the backyard fence. The same may not hold for lower income
3  Clark and Oswald (1998) analytically show that rise in others'  actions or in this case, improvements  in
service quality, induces the individual to increase his or her action (service quality). This holds true if
utility is comparison-concave.  However,  individuals with utility functions  linear in  comparisons  act
independently  of other people,  and individuals with comparison-convex  utility do the opposite of others.
13groups who have a smaller activity space, although they, too, may exchange information
largely among their social peers in local religious organizations, community centers, or
markets.
As is common in the analysis of a subjective response variable, we do not observe the
household's utility or satisfaction level Si* directly.  We can only observe the household's
evaluation of (2). In evaluating its own satisfaction level, the household selects among a
set of response categories the one which most closely matches its underlying assessment
of service quality. We do not know, however, whether the difference between 'somewhat
satisfied'  and 'satisfied', for instance, is the same as that between  'neutral'  and
'somewhat satisfied'.  The appropriate statistical  approach therefore is estimation using
the ordered probit model, which determines the threshold parameters together with the
coefficients of the explanatory variables, and yields the probabilities that a household's
actual satisfaction will match each of the five categories.
5.  Data
Two comprehensive household survey data sets for the cities of Bangalore and Jaipur in
India provide an opportunity to empirically test the model of satisfaction with public
services.  The survey methodology for both cities is largely identical  (see Deichmann et
al. 2003). Bangalore,  in the Southern Indian state of Karnataka,  is a global center for
software developiment and back-office services such as call centers. It is one of the
wealthiest cities in India with a rapidly growing middle class. However,  much of the
development has taken place in the outskirts of the city within largely self-contained
clusters of high tech establishments.  Spillovers from this dynamic sector to the general
population occur through procurement of complementary services and an increase in the
tax base. But large disparities in living standards remain, with 7.6  percent of the
population of approximately  5.6 million in 2000 living in squatter settlements  and slums,
which are distributed throughout the city. Jaipur, with a population of 2.1  million in 2000,
is the capital of the Western state of Rajasthan and is located approximately 250km
southwest of Delhi. It is a regional trade and service center and has a large tourist
industry.
14The Bangalore survey was conducted in 2001  and includes 2905 households.  In the city
of Jaipur,  1500 households were surveyed in 2002.4 Households  were selected
completely randomly across each city with sample size proportional  to the number of
households within city wards. The surveys provide detailed information on household
expenditures and own production, which yields a comprehensive  measure of each
household's welfare status based on standard conventions (Deaton 1997, Deaton and
Zaidi 2000). The surveys  also include information on household member characteristics,
access to basic public services and housing.  The services section focuses on water supply
including the types of water sources,  quantity of water consumed,  distance to water
sources and other indirect costs for households  without piped water connections, and
investments that the household has made to cope with intermittent service provision. The
survey asked each household about their satisfaction levels with various aspects of water
service provision. Some households  use more than one water source-a common  strategy
to cope with unreliable supply (Zerah 1998). In these households  satisfaction information
was collected for each source so that the number of observations in our study is larger
than the number of households (3435 in Bangalore and 1603 in Jaipur).
All variables are described in Table  1. In the empirical  analysis in the following section
we focus on satisfaction with the duration  of water supply (hours per day). Other
satisfaction studies, of income or general happiness,  use the individual as the unit of
observation. In our application, the responses represent households with the best
informed household member available at the interview time answering for the household.
Actual performance is obviously the same for all household members, but the perception
of performance  and therefore  satisfaction may be influenced by the personal
characteristics of the respondent.  Alternatively, it could be dominated by the
characteristics  of the household head regardless of who answered the survey.
Households in each sample were asked to rank their satisfaction with aspects of service
delivery on a five-tier scale. The first two responses denote. that the household is
dissatisfied or somewhat dissatisfied,  three is a neutral response, and the remaining
4 The Jaipur survey also covered about one thousand households  in  ten outlying municipalities that are as
far as 100 km  from the city. Although these are considered part of the Jaipur Urban District, we did not
include them in our analysis.
15categories indicate that the household is somewhat satisfied or satisfied. Since the
survey's purpose was much broader than investigating service provider performance,
there was no special  introduction to the satisfaction section.  This should preclude  any
negative biases in responses that may arise, if the survey is introduced to the respondent
explicitly as a means to improve local government performance.
Overall, satisfaction with water services is quite high. Table 2 shows satisfaction scores
by household  consumption quintiles.  In Bangalore,  54 percent of households state that
they are satisfied with duration of water supply.5 Satisfaction scores are higher for
wealthier households but even in the poorest consumption quintile, 44 percent of
respondents are satisfied with duration.  Disaggregated results by type of water source
(not shown here) indicate that among users of public taps, 38 percent report being
satisfied versus  18 percent dissatisfied with the duration of water supply, compared to 49
percent versus 9 percent of residents with individual connections.  Overall, satisfaction is
highest among users of individual hand pumps or tubewells and mini water systems
(local, informal water distribution networks), although these types of sources are much
less common. On other aspects of water provision, for all sources combined, 59 percent
of respondents were satisfied with the frequency of water supply (days per week),  60
percent with water pressure, 65 percent with water charges and 48 percent with water
quality.
These values for Bangalore  are considerably different from the initial report card results
reported by Paul (1998)  for the same city.  That survey, which was conducted  in 1993/94,
found that only four percent of non-poor households were satisfied or very satisfied with
the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage  Board or BWSSB (answers of 6 or 7 on a
seven-category  scale), while 46 percent were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (1 or 2).
When asked specifically about the quality of the service provided by BWSSB,  13 percent
of respondents reported being satisfied.6 In comparison to the new figures collected in
2001, this suggests a considerable improvement  in the performance of the water utility
5  Strictly speaking the percentages refer to the number of water sources for which households responded,
with a small number of households evaluating  satisfaction for two or more sources separately (e.g.,  piped
water and hand pump).
6  26 percent were reported  to be satisfied with Staff  Behavior and  18 percent with Information Provided.
16following the public pressure exerted by the Bangalore report card initiative. In fact,  a re-
survey in 1999 (Paul 2002) showed considerably higher satisfaction scores. Among
middle-class households,  42 percent stated that they were satisfied with the overall
performance of the water supply agency, with 51  percent stating that there had been
improvement in the previous  three years. For poor households, the corresponding figures
were 62 and 59 percent.  It should be kept in mind, however, that there are significant
differences  in sample selection and size among the surveys.  The first report card initiative
used a stratification of city areas based on the age of the locality.  807 households were
then selected from among middle and upper income households  and 327 from poor
households. The second report card survey included  1339 middle class and 839 poor
households.  Welfare  status was defined by residence in a slum rather than by household
consumption or income. Paul (1998)  estimates that poor households  comprise about ten
percent of the total city population which is close to the number of residents in informal
settlements in the 2001  survey.  Different interview methods and questions were used for
better-off versus poorer households since the services of interest among those groups
were assumed to differ.
Results for Jaipur indicate that 41 percent of households are satisfied with duration of
water supply and 22 percent are dissatisfied.  32 percent of households in the poorest
consumption quintile are dissatisfied with this aspect of water supply. Among other
aspects of water supply in Jaipur almost all households (95 percent) are satisfied with
frequency,  since water is generally  available on every day of the week for all households.
Table 3 shows that satisfaction levels appear to be related to actual performance of the
service provider.  In Bangalore, respondents  who stated that they are satisfied received
water for more than  11 hours per day that water is available, compared to 7-8 hours for
respondents who were not fully satisfied.  In Jaipur the results are even more pronounced.
Satisfied respondents received water for almost 14 hours  per day compared to about 3
for others.
6.  Estimation results
Table 4 and Table 5 present the results of ordered probit estimations  for satisfaction with
the duration of water supply in Bangalore  and Jaipur (equation (2)).  We present eight sets
17of estimation results for each city to evaluate their robustness across different
specifications. Columns  1-4 in each table present results using geographic neighborhood
as the reference group. For each household, the reference  group is comprised of the
closest 20 neighbors deternined using geographic  household coordinates collected during
the survey.7 In columns 5-8, in contrast,  we define the reference  or peer group in terms of
their social and economic similarity under the assumption that households most likely
compare their own service status to that of households with similar culture and welfare.
Peer groups are defined by having a common mother tongue (ethnolinguistic  similarity)
and a similar welfare status as defined by per capita consumption quantiles. In the
empirical application, welfare  status has been classified  into three and mother tongue into
four categories.  We thus obtain twelve peer groups in each city based on social and
economic similarity, which represent four language groups for each of three welfare
categories.
Within each reference  group definition,  estimations are given for specifications  where the
individual specific variables (education,  age, sex) are those of the household  head versus
those of the respondent.  Given that our unit of analysis is the household rather than the
individual, we have no a  priori  insight as to which may be more important.  The overlap
of the two is far from complete. In Bangalore, only 28 percent of the respondents  are also
the head of the household. In Jaipur the proportion is 37 percent. The remaining
distinction in the tables is between models with and without fixed effects. For Bangalore,
we include dummy variables for the six BWSSB water divisions that are geographically
defined and separately  managed, as well as for groups of similar water sources. Since
there are no water divisions in Jaipur we include only source type fixed effects in Table
5. To facilitate  interpretation of the results, we also provide  selected marginal effects in
Table 6 and Table 7. Rather than showing the effects for each satisfaction score, we
concentrate  here on the effects of the independent variables on the probability of being
satisfied with the duration of water supply (satisfaction  score = 5). The tables refer to
models with individual specific  characteristics of the household  head.
' The choice of the number of neighbors is somewhat arbitrary, since the true structure of interaction among
neighbors is unknown.  We tested specifications with  15-25 neighbors,  but found that the empirical  results
are not significantly affected.
18The estimated  coefficients for 'hours per day'  (HPD) in Tables 4 and 5 test the
significance of service provider performance on household satisfaction. We find that the
direct benefits from own service quality are positive and significant when we use
geographic neighbors as the reference  group in Bangalore  and for all specifications in
Jaipur. The estimated coefficients for own service improvements are not statistically
significant for households in Bangalore when the reference group is based on economic
and social similarity. Tables  6 and 7 show the marginal  impact of increasing water
availability  by one hour per day on the probability of being satisfied. The impacts are
quite small in the Bangalore, with the estimated marginal effects (using geographic
neighbors) ranging from 0.08 to 1.3 percent. The effects are larger in Jaipur. Increasing
water availability  by an additional  hour per day increases the probability of being
satisfied by 1.6 to 3.8 percent. For illustrative purposes, we use the estimated coefficients
from Table 5 (column 1) to show the impact of improving water availability from the
minimum of one hour per day to the maximum of twenty-four hours in Jaipur.  This
improvement would increase the probability that the household is satisfied from 20
percent to 92 percent.
The finding that a larger number of hours that water is available will increase  satisfaction
with this aspect of water supply is, of course,  intuitive. Otherwise there would be no
rationale for satisfaction  surveys. The main question considered here is if other factors
also matter when controlling for objective indicators of service quality.  The coefficients
for relative HPD  in Tables 4 to 7 provide estimates of the importance of  reference or peer
group performance  in determining  satisfaction. It is defined as the natural logarithm of
the ratio of own versus reference group hours per day and varies theoretically from -3.18,
where the household receives water for only one hour and the reference  group for twenty
four hours, to +3.18 in the opposite case.
Our results for Bangalore  show that households receive positive and significant utility
from having better service levels than their reference group. This means that satisfaction
with service provision increases,  as the households'  service level improves relative to that
of its reference group. The estimated coefficients are larger when the reference group is
defined in terms of social and economic  similarity. The marginal effects in Tables 6 and 7
19show the increase in the probability that the household is satisfied with a one unit change
in the natural log of the ratio of the household's  service levels relative to its reference
group.  This corresponds, for example, to a change from a situation where the household
receives water for about one third of the number of hours of the reference group, to one
where both receive water for the same number of hours.
For Bangalore,  in Table 6, the marginal  effects show that a one unit increase  in 'relative
HPD' increases satisfaction by 5.5-6.4 percent when the reference group is defined
geographically,  and about  17 percent when the reference group is based on economic  and
social similarity. This suggests that the interaction among 'social'  peers is stronger than
among spatially proximate neighbors.  We should, however, keep in mind that the effects
of own service quality in Bangalore are insignificant when the reference group is based
on a socioeconomic  characteristics.  This would imply that utility or satisfaction in this
case comes largely from inter-household comparisons.
The results are similar for Jaipur.  Table 5 shows that 'relative HPD'  is not significant
when we use geographic neighbors, but positive and significant when we use economic
and social similarity to define the reference group. The marginal effects reported in Table
7 indicate that a one-unit increase in 'relative HPD'  increases satisfaction by 15-17
percent, when the reference group is based on economic and social similarity. These
results for Bangalore and Jaipur support our hypothesis that satisfaction or utility is not
only a function of a household's own condition, but is also driven by relative status vis-a-
vis its reference  group. We also find that interaction or comparative  evaluation of service
performance may be more important among households sharing common economic  and
social characteristics, rather than among those that live nearby.
Among the household level variables, the welfare  level has a consistently strong and
positive effect in both cities on the household's  satisfaction with the duration of water
supply. We measure household welfare as total annual household  consumption net of
expenditures  for water and control for household size separately.  In Jaipur, for example,  a
one-unit rise from the mean of the log of household consumption-i.e., from  103,817 to
282,203 rupees-increases  the probability that the household is satisfied by about 14 to
2018 percent.  This is a reflection of the fact that wealthier households tend to have
individual water connections and are able to make complementary investments in water
pumps and storage tanks. They are therefore sheltered from the nuisance of intermittent
water supply.
Homeownership  and long term tenancy (tenure status) has a significant and negative
effect on satisfaction levels  in Bangalore.  The parameter estimates are only marginally
significant or insignificant in Jaipur, which is most likely a reflection of the very large
number of home owners (90 percent). In addition to home owners, we include long-term
renters who have lived in their dwelling  for twenty years or more. In most Indian cities,
rent controls and other housing market regulations  make it likely that long term tenants
have the same incentives as home owners. The negative  sign for the tenure variable
coefficients  suggest that owners and long term tenants tend to be less satisfied with the
duration of water supply than short term renters. Tables 6 and 7 indicate that, on average,
satisfaction  levels for homeowners are lower by about 6 percent. There may be several
reasons for this finding.  Homeowners have higher expectations for service provision
since the quality of service access will be directly reflected in the home value. Longer
term residents also have a higher stake in having good services compared to transitional
or short-term residents.  In addition, home owners are likely to interact with service
providers directly, while many renters pay for services through their rental payment.
Homeowners will thus experience any shortcomings  in provider responsiveness
personally, which may be reflected in lower satisfaction  scores. Finally among household
level variables,  an increase  in household size decreases  satisfaction,  since larger families
have greater water requirements.  Inadequate service provision will therefore result in
greater dissatisfaction.
Most of the individual specific variables have no significant effect on the satisfaction
levels of households regardless whether we use characteristics of the household head or
those of the respondent.  The exception  are the coefficients  for female headed households
in Bangalore, which are positive and significant. We should not over-interpret this result
given the inconsistencies across specifications. However it is interesting that the
coefficient signs for this variable in most specifications suggest that females tend to be
21more satisfied with the duration of water supply than males. This is a counter-intuitive
finding since we would expect that females carry a greater share of the burden in water
collection. Female headed households are likely to be poorer and have generally  lower
levels of service availability.  The only credible explanation  is that females,  being more
involved in water procurement,  have a more realistic expectation of actual service
performance, and are more likely to base satisfaction responses on what the service utility
will provide rather than what it should deliver. In general, however, these results for
individual level variables confirm that any positive or negative experience concerning  the
quality of basic services is shared among all household members, so that we can expect
consistent responses regardless of who in the household responds to a scorecard  type
question.
7.  Conclusions
The economics of basic services favor large-scale provision by public or private
monopolies.  In the absence of market mechanisms,  a utility's customers have little
recourse if service provision remains inadequate.  Citizen groups and development
agencies consider satisfaction surveys or report cards evaluating public service delivery
an effective 'voice' mechanism to exert pressure on providers to improve performance.
Donors and multilateral  institutions see public disclosure of such information as an
important tool for increasing governance and empowerment at the local and national
level. But there is surprisingly little evidence on what such surveys actually measure and
how well people's stated perceptions reflect actual service levels.  In any such effort there
is the risk of capture of benefits from public action by those who are best organized or
who scream the loudest. This paper investigated whether the "squeaky wheel" effect
dominates in scorecard initiatives or whether they can truly be considered  an effective
tool for improved, information-based  public management.
Our findings generally support the case for scorecards. In carefully administered  surveys
in the cities of Bangalore and Jaipur, stated satisfaction with the duration of water supply
generally reflect the actual availability of water at the household level. Household
satisfaction with the public utility's performance tends to increase with an increase  in the
22hours per day that water is available. Conversely, those households who are less satisfied
tend to have less dependable water supply.
Satisfaction, however,  is a subjective measure that is not easily benchmarked on an
objective scale. Factors other than actual service provider performance  do play a role in
determining satisfaction with water services. One issue of particular interest is whether
findings from the welfare and happiness literature about the influence of reference group
characteristics also hold for satisfaction surveys. We find evidence that this is the case,
confirmning that household's expectations are, in part, influenced by what they see among
their neighbors or peers, even after controlling for the actual level of service availability.
Households that are better off than their neighbors tend to be more satisfied and vice
versa. These results are consistent for Bangalore for both reference  group definitions and
for Jaipur when the peer group is defined by culture and welfare. The implication is that
peer group effects are clearly relevant, but that their definition requires considerable
insights into the nature of social relations in a particular setting. An important policy
implication  is that overall satisfaction is to some extent a function of equality of service
access.  Everything else being equal, households would be more satisfied if service levels
do not deviate significantly from those of their reference groups. Investment could thus
be targeted specifically at reducing unequal service access by bringing the worst off
neighborhoods up to the level of their peers.
In addition to performance and peer group effects, household  level characteristics  matter.
in determining satisfaction  levels. Wealthier households can make complementary
investments such as storage tanks and tend to be more satisfied. Homeowners tend to be
less satisfied, all else being equal. Their expectations are higher since they expect to live
in the dwelling unit for longer and service quality will be reflected  in the value of their
home.
These results provide a cautious endorsement for scorecard initiatives as a tool for policy
dialogue.  A caveat of any user survey, however,  is that the way in which the question is
asked can have a significant impact on the answers.  This certainly applies to opinion
surveys, but, to a lesser degree, even to surveys that ask respondents to judge their own
23experience.  Scorecard initiatives can misrepresent actual conditions just as selective
disclosure of information by public utilities may mislead the public. They will be
counterproductive,  if they do not include objective measures of service quality that are
based on clear standards, do not account for complementary  characteristics  of
respondents,  or if they are framed using an activist perspective.  In any case, results from
opinion or satisfaction surveys need to be interpreted  carefully, including those reported
here. The potential benefits from such feedback for improving service provision by
public utilities, however,  are undeniable.  Those benefits can only be achieved, however,
if the service provider is responsive.  Transparency  and accountability are often lacking
among public utilities. Where providers are willing to issue clearly defined benchmarks
to which users can compare their own service levels, many of the caveats discussed in
this paper apply to a much lesser degree. In those cases, independent scorecard initiatives
can be a truly effective tool for holding the public sector to account.
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26Table 1: Variables
Bangalore  Jaipur
Variable  Description  Mean  Std.  Mean  Std.
dev  dev
Dependent variable
Satisfaction  with  Household satisfaction  with duration of water supply:  3.90  1.41  3.42  1.64
duration  I = Dissatisfied;  2 = Somewhat dissatisfied; 3 = Neutral;
4 = Somewhat  satisfied; 5 = Satisfied
Performance
Hours per day  Duration of water supply:  Hours per day that water is available from  .9.61  7.81  7.37  9.06
(HPD)  the water source
Ref. group HPD  Log of ratio of own HPD versus HPD of geographic neighbors  -0.23  0.82  -0.41  1.06
Log of ratio of own HPD versus HPD of socioeconomic  peer group  -0.32  0.81  -0.70  1.17
Household  characteristics
Welfare  status  Log  of annual household consumption  in Rupees  net of  11.63  0.54  11.54  0.51
expenditures for water
Tenure  status  Household owns dwelling unit or has lived  in same unit for 20 years  0.64  - 0.90
or more
Household size  Log of the number of persons in household  1.48  0.36  1.63  0.45
Individual  characteristics
Education  Household head has at least a high school degree  0.76  - 0.74  -
Respondent has at least a high school degree  0.74  - 0.73
Age  Log of age of household  head  3.83  0.26  3.85  0.29
Log of age of respondent  3.59  0.39  3.57  0.39
Sex  Gender of household head: Female = 1, Male = 0,  0.07  - 0.06  -
Gender of respondent:  Female = 1, Male = 0,  0.61  - 0.57  -
Fixed  effects
Water divisions  Available for Bangalore  only: five BWSSB water zones plus one
zone for households outside of the BWSSB area
Source type  I = Individual/piped  water connection or sub-connection  0.66  - 0.78
Source type  2 = Individual  handpump, tubewell  or mini water system  0.12  - 0.12  -
Source type  3 = Community tube well, tap or hand pump  0.21  - 0.05  -
Source type  4 = Water tanker, other vendor, or surface water  0.01  - 0.06
27Table 2: Satisfaction  with duration of water supply by welfare status (percent)
Consumption  quintile
I  ii  m  IV  V  All
Bangalore
Dissatisfied  17.3  11.6  9.0  6.8  4.1  9.9
Somewhat dissatisfied  16.4  15.7  13.5  9.6  7.7  12.6
Neutral  6.8  8.7  8.1  6.9  6.8  7.5
Somewhat satisfied  15.0  18.0  17.0  15.5  16.8  16.5
Satisfied  44.4  46.1  52.3  61.2  64.7  53.5
Jaipur
Dissatisfied  32.1  23.6  21.4  19.1  13.6  22.0
Somewhat dissatisfied  12.5  14.6  19.9  16.9  10.7  14.9
Neutral  2.2  4.5  4.3  2.5  2.8  3.3
Somewhat satisfied  16.8  17.2  16.1  19.4  23.7  18.6
Satisfied  36.4  40.1  38.2  42.2  49.2  41.2
Table 3: Satisfaction and performance
Bangalore  Jaipur
Satisfaction  Avg. hours  Std.  Avg. hours  Std.
per day  deviation  per day  deviation
Dissatisfied  7.2  7.4  3.3  6.2
Somewhat dissatisfied  7.2  6.8  2.4  3.8
Neutral  7.7  6.5  2.9  5.3
Somewhat satisfied  7.6  5.9  2.5  3.0
Satisfied  11.6  8.3  13.9  10.5
Total  9.6  7.8  7.3  9.4
28Table 4: Satisfaction estimation for duration of water supply (Bangalore)
Reference group defined geographically  Reference group defined by language/welfare
Household head  Respondent  Household head  Respondent
characteristics  characteristics  characteristics  characteristics
Hours per day  0.020  0.032  0.020  0.032  -0.007  0.001  -0.007  0.001
(0.006)**  (0.007)**  (0.006)**  (0.007)**  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)
Relative HPD  0.187  0.167  0.186  0.166  0.444  0.438  0.447  0.441
(0.053)**  (0.057)**  (0.053)**  (0.057)**  (0.066)**  (0.072)**  (0.066)**  (0.072)**
Welfare status  0.389  0.226  0.389  0.218  0.399  0.232  0.399  0.224
(0.043)**  (0.046)**  (0.043)**  (0.045)**  (0.043)**  (0.046)**  (0.042)**  (0.045)**
Tenure status  -0.182  -0.164  -0.159  -0.147  -0.178  -0.163  -0.156  -0.147
(0.044)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)**  (0.044)**
Household size  -0.267  -0.182  -0.249  -0.172  -0.285  -0.196  -0.267  -0.186
(0.062)**  (0.063)**  (0.060)**  (0.061)**  (0.062)**  (0.063)**  (0.060)**  (0.060)**
Education  0.064  0.017  0.085  0.042  0.061  0.013  0.083  0.040
(0.050)  (0.050)  (0.048)+  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.048)+  (0.050)
Age  0.162  0.073  0.049  0.014  0.161  0.072  0.047  0.011
(0.084)+  (0.080)  (0.050)  (0.060)  (0.083)+  (0.080)  (0.050)  (0.060)
Sex  0.244  0.248  0.075  . 0.065  0.226  0.231  0.061  0.052
(0.081)**  (0.083)**  (0.042)+  (0.040)  (0.082)**  (0.083)**  (0.040)  (0.040)
Water division 2  -0.031  -0.042  -0.032  -0.042
(0.070)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.070)
Water division 3  -0.057  -0.065  -0.081  -0.088
(0.070)  (0.060)  (0.070)  (0.060)
Water division 4  0.106  0.101  0.077  0.072
(0.070)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.070)
Water division 5  0.102  0.101  0.062  0.060
(0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)
Water division 6  -0.208  -0.237  -0.247  -0.274
(0.150)  (0.150)  (0.145)+  (0.146)+
Source type  1  0.753  0.741  0.700  0.688
(0.216)**  (0.218)**  (0.220)**  (0.222)**
Source type 2  0.549  0.535  0.593  0.578
(0.23 1)*  (0.233)*  (0.235)*  (0.238)*
Source type 3  0.224  0.216  0.175  0.166
(0.220)  (0.220)  (0.220)  (0.220)
Log Likelihood  -4226.751  -4170.233  -4238.805  -4181.672  -4207.885  -4153.279  -4219.715  -4164.596
Likelihood ratio  354.507  467.543  351.856  466.122  392.239  501.451  390.038  500.275
Prob > LR  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Robust standard errors  in parentheses
+ significant at  10 percent;  * significant at 5  percent; ** significant at I percent
29Table 5:Satisfaction estimation for duration of water supply (Jaipur)
Reference  group defined geographically  Reference group defined  by language/welfare
Household head  Respondent  Household head  Respondent
charcteristics  characteristics  characteristics  characteristics
Hours per day  0.096  0.095  0.097  0.094  0.040  0.030  0.041  0.030
- (0.007)i*  (0.008)**  (0.007)**  (0.008)**  (0.01 1)**  (0.01 1)**  (0.010)**  (0.0  )t**
Relative  HPD  -0.078  -0.068  -0.080  -0.069  0.387  0.429  0.385  0.428
(0.053)  (0.044)  (0.053)  (0.044)  (0.072)**  (0.071)**  (0.072)+*  (0.071)**
.Welfare status  0.450  0.427  0.405  0.375  0.383  0.353  0.342  0.305
(0.066)*0  (0.068)**  (0.064)**  (0.067)**  (0.067)**  (0.070)+*  (0.066)**  (0.068)**
Tenure status  -0.168  -0.169  -0.196  -0.197  -0.166  -0.164  -0.195  -0.192
(0.103)  (0.102)+  (0.102)+  (0.101)+  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.103)+  (0.103)+
Household size  -0.267  -0.262  -0.273  -0.269  -0.239  -0.236  -0.246  -0.244
(0.072)*$  (0.073)**  (0.071)**  (0.071)**  (0.073)**  (0.073)**  (0.071)**  (0.071)**
Education  -0.049  -0.047  0.028  0.037  -0.046  -0.042  0.020  0.032
(0.067)  (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.070)
Age  -0.196  -0.213  -0.065  -0.070  -0.194  -0.212  -0.064  -0.070
(0.114)+  (0.113)+  (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.115)+  (0.115)+  (0.074)  (0.075)
Sex  -0.136  -0.121  0.059  0.062  -0.143  -0.118  0.048  0.056
(0.118)  (0.120)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.060)  (0.060)
Source type  I  0.332  0.339  0.494  0.499
(0.1I99)+  (0.1I99)+  (0. 196)*  (0.196)*
Source type 2  -0.033  -0.064  -0.123  -0.152
(0.144)  (0.144)  (0.147)  (0.146)
Source type 3  -0.298  -0.288  -0.162  -0.155
(0.222)  (0.223)  (0.222)  (0.222)
Log Likelihood  -1953.444  -1947.393  -1956.695  -1950.561  -1939.60  -1930.480  -1943.112  -1933.684
Likelihood ratio  579.017  591.120  577.646  589.914  606.692  624.944  604.811  623.668
Prob > LR  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Robust standard errors  in parentheses
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent;  *4  significant at 1 percent
30Table 6: Marginal effect  on the probability of being
satisfied with the duration of water supply (Bangalore)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Hours per day  0.008  0.013  -0.003  0.000
Relative HPD  0.064  0.055  0.177  0.174
Welfare status  0.157  0.094  0.160  0.096
Tenure status  -0.066  -0.059  -0.065  -0.058
Household Size  -0.115  -0.081  -0.121  -0.085
Education  0.026  0.009  0.025  0.007
Age  0.060  0.025  0.060  0.025
Sex  0.104  0.106  0.097  0.100
Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes
Reference  Group  Geographic  Geographic  Socio-  Socio-
economic  economic
Table 7: Marginal effect  on the probability of being
satisfied with the duration of water supply (Jaipur)'
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Hoursperday  0.038  0.037  .0.016  0.012
Relative  HPD  -0.031  -0.027  0.151  0.167
Welfare status  0.176  0.167  0.150  0.138
Tenure status  -0.066  -0.067  -0.065  -0.065
Household Size  -0.105  -0.103  -0.093  -0.092
Education  -0.019  -0.018  -0.018  -0.017
Age  -0.077  -0.084  -0.076  -0.083
Sex  -0.053  -0.047  0.055  -0.045
Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes
Reference Group  Geographic  Geographic  Socio-  Socio-
economic  economic
Using individual level  characteristics of the household head.
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